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Recent Development
SNYDER v. MEKHJIAN: NEW JERSEY AIDS ASSISTANCE ACT
PERMITS LIMITED DISCOVERY OF BLOOD DONOR
INFORMATION BY PLAINTIFF SUING HEALTH CARE ENTITY
FOR CONTRACTION OF AIDS THROUGH BLOOD
TRANSFUSION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the decade since Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
was first identified, 202,843 cases of AIDS have been reported to the
Centers for Disease Control,' 4,306 of which have been attributed to
blood transfusions.2 Many of these transfusion-related AIDS cases have
1. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,

(1991) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS

SURVEILLANCE REPORT

SURVEILLANCE REPORT].

8

Acquired Immune Defi-

ciency Syndrome (AIDS) was first identified in the United States in 1981. Marsha F. Goldsmith, Not There Yet, But 'On Our Way' in AIDS Research, Scientists Say,
253 JAMA 3369, 3369 (1985). Estimates indicate that the number of new cases
of AIDS is likely to increase through 1993, and that between 1989 and 1993 the
death toll from AIDS will reach between 285,000 and 340,000. CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, CURRENT TRENDS, ESTIMATES OF HIV PREVALENCE AND PROJECTED AIDS CASES: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP, OCTOBER 31-NOVEMBER 1, 1989,
reported in 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 110, 117 (1990).
AIDS "is a specific group of diseases or conditions which are indicative of
severe immunosuppression related to infection with the human immu-

nodeficiency virus." HIV/AIDS

SURVEILLANCE REPORT,

supra, at 1. The human

immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is the causative agent of AIDS. John Howard,
HIV Screening: Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 601, 601 (1988)
(citing Samuel Broder & Robert Gallo, A Pathogenic Retrovirus (HTLV-Ill) Linked
to AIDS, 311 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1292 (1984)). An individual who is infected with
HIV is described as having "an asymptomatic condition characterized by laboratory abnormalities only." Id. at 601 n. 1 (citing Centers for Disease Control, Classification System for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy-Associated
Virus Infections, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 334 (1986)). An individual is described as having AIDS when his or her immune system fails and secondary conditions, such as opportunistic infections, arise. Gregory Woods & Ann
Thornton, Deadly Blood: Litigation of Transfusion-AssociatedAIDS Cases in Texas, 21
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 667, 675 (1990).
Suits can be instituted against blood suppliers when the plaintiff merely
tests positive for HIV. Although a clear clinical difference exists between testing
HIV-positive and having the disease termed AIDS, for purposes of this article,
no distinction will be drawn between the two conditions.
2. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. By 1983, experts
suspected that HIV could be transmitted by blood and blood products. Warren
R. Janowitz, Safety of the Blood Supply: Liability for Transfusion-AssociatedAIDS, 9 J.
LEGAL MED. 611, 612 (1988). The Centers for Disease Control estimated that
between 1974 and 1984, 29,000 individuals received HIV-infected blood. Id. at
611 (citing T.A. Peterman et al., Estimating the Risks of Transfusion-AssociatedAcquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 27
TRANSFUSION 371 (1987)). In one particular case, where a specific blood supply

(337)
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generated litigation in which the blood recipient seeks to recover damwas recalled, it was found that HIV-contaminated plasma from one donor, who
donated blood more than 50 times in 1982 and 1983, was present in more than
65,000 vials of a blood product used to treat Hemophilia A. Id. at 620 n.20.
With the discovery that HIV could be transmitted by blood transfusion,
blood banks became concerned about their potential liability to those who received HIV-infected blood products. Karen S. Lipton, Blood Donor Services and
Liability Issues Relating to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131,
140-42 (1986). In response to this concern, and in an effort to reduce the transmission of AIDS through blood products, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) issued its first set of recommendations to blood collecting organizations.
Id. at 144. These recommendations were designed to develop educational programs to inform persons at increased risk for AIDS that they should not donate
blood, to educate donor screening personnel to detect signs and symptoms of
AIDS, and to require the quarantine and proper disposal of all blood collected
from donors who were known to have, or who were suspected of having, AIDS.
Id. (citing OFFICE OF BIOLOGICS, FEDERAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO DECREASE THE RISK OF TRANSMITTING ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY

SYNDROME (AIDS) FROM BLOOD DONORS (1983)). The FDA recommendations
are significant because the resolution of negligence causes of action for the
transmission of HIV through blood products collected after March 1983 focuses
in part upon how effectively defendant blood suppliers implemented these recommendations. See id. at 145. For a discussion of the negligence cause of action
in the context of transfusion-related AIDS litigation, see infra note 14.
In early 1985, blood supply organizations began to manufacture Human TLymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus (HTLV
III/LAV) antibody test kits to detect HIV antibodies in donated blood. See Lipton, supra, at 131. The use of the enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay (ELISA)
and supplemental Western Blot tests currently screens out more than 99% of
HIV-infected blood. Alinka F. Baker, Comment, Liability Without Fault and the
AIDS Plague Compel a New Approach to Cases of Transfusion-Transmitted Disease, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 81, 82 (1990) (citing 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 137,
139 (1987)). According to statistics collected by the American Red Cross,
before the ELISA test became available, recipients of blood transfusions had a
one out of 550 chance of receiving HIV-contaminated blood. Id. at 82 (citing
RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 547 (1988)). With the advent of testing procedures in March, 1985, this risk dropped to one in 40,000. Id. (citing
THE BUSINESS JOURNAL-PHOENIX & THE VALLEY OF THE SUN,July 11, 1988, at 2).
Notwithstanding these procedures, some HIV-positive blood donations
continue to elude detection. Aside from errors committed in the testing process, false negative test results may occur in situations in which a person has
been exposed to HIV, but antibody production in response to this exposure has
not reached a sufficient level so as to be detected by testing. See Allan Gibofsky
&Jeffrey C. Laurence, AIDS: Current Medical and Scientific Aspects, 9J. LEGAL MED.
497, 499 (1988). In most instances, HIV antibody production will begin within
seven to 40 days after exposure to the virus. Id. Nonetheless, antibodies to HIV
must reach a significant level in order to be detectable by test methodologies,
and experts have reached no consensus regarding the length of time that must
elapse between exposure to the virus, antibody production and a positive test
result. See id. at 499 (detectable antibody production may not occur for as long
as nine to twelve months after viral exposure); Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policyfor HIV-Related Information: An Analytical Framework For Sorting Out Hard
and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. REV. 871, 881 (1989) (antibody production detectable
by test procedures may not occur for as long as thirty-six months after infection); Baker, Comment, supra, at 82 (suggesting 12-week period between exposure and positive test result). Moreover, false negative test results have
occurred in persons in the later stages of infection who appear to have "lost"
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ages from the blood supplier.3

In such cases, however, the plaintiff

their HIV antibody positivity after previously testing positive for the disease. See
Janowitz, supra, at 615. This finding suggests that such individuals might have a
latent form of AIDS that is undetectable by testing, but is still capable of transmission. Id.
Considering all defects in the testing process, in 1987 it was estimated that,
at worst, as many as four out of 96 HIV-infected blood donors would not be
detected by antibody testing. Joseph R. Bove, Transfusion Associated Hepatitis and
AIDS, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 242, 244 (1987) (noting that better methods for
detecting HIV in donated blood would not completely eliminate risk of
transmission).
AIDS is not a frequently reported complication of blood transfusions. Id. at
243. Furthermore, the number of transfusion-related AIDS cases reported to
the Centers for Disease Control may be lower than the actual number. This
underreporting is due to the tendency of physicians to decline to disclose such
information, and because cases must meet a rigid case-surveillance definition of
AIDS to be included in the report. Id. at 243-44.
Case law indicates that individuals have contracted AIDS from blood that
had tested falsely negative for antibodies to the virus. See, e.g., Boutte v. Blood
Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 123 (W.D. La. 1989) (plaintiff brought suit against
community blood bank for negligence after plaintiff contracted AIDS from
blood that had tested negative for HIV antibody); Michael B. Coakley, Patients
Got Blood Tainted With HIV, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 21, 1991, at 12-BR (two Lancaster General Hospital patients tested HIV-positive after receiving blood from
patient who had tested falsely negative for HIV).
AIDS may also be transmitted when blood center personnel fail to perform
blood testing prior to transfusion. See, e.g., Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121
F.R.D. 300, 301 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (finding that after infusion of several units of
untested blood product into plaintiff, tests performed on blood revealed one
unit contaminated with AIDS virus).
Some blood recipients have contracted AIDS through transfusion of HIVcontaminated blood donated during the pre-testing era. See, e.g., Bradway v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 78-79 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (plaintiff received HIV-contaminated blood in April, 1983 transfusion); Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 361 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (plaintiff received HIVcontaminated blood in transfusion taking place before blood screening tests
were available); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 647
(D.S.C. 1989) (plaintiff received HIV-contaminated blood in January 1985 transfusion); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 420 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988) (plaintiff received HIV-contaminated blood in July 1984 transfusion);
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr. 563 A.2d 531, 532-33 (Pa. Super. 1989)
(plaintiff received HIV-contaminated blood following October 1984 automobile
accident), aff'd, 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992); Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. &
C. 3d 178, 178 (Allegheny County 1987) (plaintiff received HIV-contaminated
blood while undergoing heart surgery in January 1985).
3. See, e.g., Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 851 F.2d 437, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(HIV-contaminated blood collected by defendant blood bank and administered
by defendant medical center infected newborn blood transfusion recipient); Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 192 (2d Cir. 1987) (HIV-contaminated
blood product manufactured by defendants infected hemophiliac plaintiff);
Jones v. Miles Lab., Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1127, 1128 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (HIV-contaminated blood product manufactured by defendants infected hemophiliac
plaintiff), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1127 (1 1th Cir. 1988); McKee v. Miles Lab., Inc., 675 F.
Supp. 1060, 1061 (E.D. Ky. 1987) (AIDS-contaminated blood coagulant supplied by defendant manufacturer infected plaintiff's deceased hemophiliac husband), aff'd, 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v.
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blood recipient's ability to recover is often hampered at the discovery
stage of litigation when the defendant blood supplier refuses to release
pertinent blood donor information to the plaintiff.4 Defendant blood
suppliers resist such discovery requests by claiming that nondisclosure
of blood donor information should be favored by the courts in order to
further important public policies, such as the donor's privacy rights,5 the
physician-patient privilege, 6 and/or the future adequacy and safety of
the nation's blood supply. 7 When the courts do not permit such discovDistrict Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1004 (Colo. 1988) (HIV-contaminated blood supplied by defendant blood center infected plaintiff blood transfusion recipient).
HIV-contaminated blood donations that elude testing methodologies, in
addition to those made before testing procedures were implemented, have resulted in virtual death sentences to persons who have been transfused with these
blood products. Such blood donations have also resulted in potential liability to
persons and organizations within the health care industry. Woods & Thornton,
supra note 1, at 676; see, e.g., Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125
F.R.D. 646, 647 (D.S.C. 1989) (involving negligence suit brought by HIV-contaminated blood recipient against hospital and blood center); Mason v. Regional
Medical Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300, 301 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (involving suit brought by
HIV-contaminated blood product recipient against medical center in which
plaintiff alleged negligent care, strict liability, breach of implied warranty of fitness, and loss of consortium); Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1004 (involving suit
brought by HIV-contaminated blood recipient against blood center for negligence in screening donors and testing donated blood); Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582
A.2d 307, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (involving suit brought by HIVcontaminated blood product recipient against blood bank, hospital, and others
for negligently supplying blood and seeking limited discovery from donor), aff'd
per curiam, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991); Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S. 2d 475,
476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (involving wrongful death action brought by decedent's widow against blood bank for decedent's contraction of AIDS from blood
transfusion and seeking disclosure of donors' names).
Potential liability for contraction of AIDS is not limited to those individuals
and organizations within the health care industry. In one case, a plaintiff
brought a suit against the driver and owner of an automobile for personal injuries the plaintiff's decedent sustained when he was struck by defendant's automobile. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla.
1987). While hospitalized for these injuries, plaintiff's decedent received 51
units of blood; he was later diagnosed with and subsequently died of AIDS, allegedly as a result of receiving HIV-contaminated blood. Id. Plaintiff sought to
prove that AIDS was essentially an aggravation of the decedent's injuries, in that
the source of his disease was the necessary medical treatment he received in
response to the injuries he sustained in the accident. Id. Thus, plaintiff sought
to hold these personal injury defendants responsible for the decedent's contraction of AIDS.
4. For a discussion of the necessity of blood donor information to plaintiff's
recovery, see infra note 8 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of blood donors' privacy rights, see infra notes 28-39
and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the physician-patient privilege in the context of litigation involving contraction of AIDS from blood transfusions, see infra notes 4049 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the impact of discovery of blood donor information
on the safety and adequacy of the nation's blood supply, see infra notes 50-58
and accompanying text.
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ery, plaintiffs are often precluded from recovery because the defendant
blood suppliers retain exclusive control over the blood donor information necessary to establish liability. 8
In Snyder v. Mekhjian,9 a plaintiff blood recipients sought information regarding an unidentified donor from the defendant blood supplier
in order to garner the evidence necessary to prove the blood supplier's
negligence in providing the plaintiff with AIDS-infected blood.' 0 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed per curiam a Superior Court of
NewJersey decision granting the plaintiff blood recipient limited discovery of blood donor information.l'
8. Woods & Thornton, supra note 1, at 677. In transfusion-related AIDS
cases, the blood donor is often the only unbiased individual able to provide the
factual information necessary to determine the liability of health care entities.
See, e.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003,
1007 (Colo. 1988) (stating that only donor and blood center technician who interviewed donor knew whether blood center followed its screening procedures

before accepting blood from infected donor); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp.
Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 535 (Pa. Super. 1989) (finding that donor is only individual
with information to refute claims of defendant that donor was carefully and completely evaluated prior to donation), afd, 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992); Gulf Coast
Regional Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding that plaintiff "possesses a legitimate interest in the identity of the blood
donors" and stating that plaintiff asserted that blood donors possessed relevant
facts required to prosecute cause of action against blood center); Tarrant
County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (reasoning that without discovery from blood donors, plaintiff would not likely be
able to prosecute cause of action against defendant).
9. 593 A.2d 318 (NJ. 1991). For a thorough discussion of the Snyder opinion, see infra notes 65-125 and accompanying text.
10. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 320 (Pollock, J., concurring). During discovery, the
defendant blood bank produced the donor's records, but deleted the donor's
name and address. Id. (Pollock, J. concurring). The blood bank opposed further discovery and thereby impeded plaintiffs' ability to prove their case. Id. at
320, 324 (Pollock, J., concurring). The blood bank claimed that the donor did
not have AIDS at the time he donated the unit of blood that was ultimately transfused into plaintiff. Id. at 324 (Pollock,J., concurring). This assertion was made
by the blood bank at the same time it maintained control over the information
necessary for plaintiffs to challenge this contention and meet their burden of
proof. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
11. Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 314-15 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990), aff'd per curiam, 593 A.2d 318 (NJ. 1991). In affirming the decision of the
superior court, the Supreme Court of NewJersey expressly stated that its rationale was substantially the same as was expressed by Judge Pressler for the superior court. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 319. Justice Pollock authored a separate
concurring opinion in order "to emphasize the court's reliance on the statutory
balance of the donor's privacy interest, the plaintiffs' interest in full discovery
and compensation for the injuries they have sustained, and society's interest in a
safe and adequate blood supply." Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). Because Justice
Pollock's concurrence adopts and expands upon the analysis of the lower court,
this author has chosen to concentrate her analysis on the concurring opinion.
For a discussion of Justice Pollock's concurring opinion, see infra notes 65-113
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the lower court's decision, see infra
note 85.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Snyder v. Mekhjian
indicates that a plaintiff's need for disclosure, and the interest of the
public in obtaining this donor information, may outweigh the privacy
rights of blood donors and the interest of blood banks in attracting voluntary blood donors.12 This ruling opens the door to recovery by plaintiffs who have contracted AIDS through blood transfusions-a door that
may have otherwise remained closed because blood suppliers have previously been permitted to withhold from discovery information that is
essential to the imposition of liability.' 3
II.

BACKGROUND

In most transfusion-related AIDS litigation, the plaintiff blood
recipient sues the defendant blood supplier under theories of
negligence, 14 breach of implied
warranty,1 5 and
strict lia12. For a thorough discussion of Snyder, see infra notes 65-125 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the plaintiffs' interests in discovery of relevant
information, see infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
blood donors' rights to confidentiality and privacy, see infra notes 28-39 and
accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the projected impact of Snyder on future litigation,
see infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 79 (N.D.
Ga. 1990) (blood recipient alleged that Red Cross was negligent in its blood
collection practices); Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 123 (W.D. La.
1989) (blood recipient sued blood bank for negligence in failing to adequately
screen its donors and test donated blood); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood
Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 647 (D.S.C. 1989) (blood recipient alleged blood center
was negligent in failing to employ surrogate test before January, 1985, for identifying high risk blood donors and failing to disqualify blood donor with AIDS
based upon his health history elicited prior to donation); Belle Bonfils Memorial
Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1004 (Colo. 1988) (blood recipient
sued blood center for negligent screening of blood donor and negligent testing
of blood); Snyder, 582 A.2d at 309-10 (blood recipient asserted negligence claims
against physicians for failing to advise plaintiff of risk of receiving contaminated
blood and of reasonable alternatives to receiving donated blood, and against
blood center for failing to implement risk-reducing procedures in blood collection process), aff'dper curiam, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley
Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 533 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (plaintiff who contracted
AIDS from blood transfusion asserted negligence cause of action against hospital and blood center), aff'd, 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992). For a more thorough discussion of the negligence analysis as it should be applied to transfusion-related
AIDS cases, see infra note 18.
15. See, e.g., Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300, 301 (W.D. Ky.
1988) (plaintiff who received transfusion of blood product infected with AIDS
virus sued medical center alleging breach of implied warranty of fitness); Stenger,
563 A.2d at 533 (blood recipient and family sued hospital and blood center
under theory of breach of warranty after recipient, husband and son tested positive for HIV); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) (decedent's estate brought suit for wrongful death against hospital alleging breach of implied warranty in hospital's failure to provide wholesome blood product).
Plaintiff blood recipients assert implied warranty causes of action premised
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on two principles of contract law. The first of these principles is the implied
warranty of merchantability, under which the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) provides that "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind." U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1989). In order for goods to be merchantable,
they "must be at least such as... are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used." Id. § 2-314(2)(c). The second principle is the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under which the U.C.C. provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is ... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
Id. § 2-315.
The distinction between the two principles appears negligible, but is indeed
significant. Under the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose principle, the
seller warrants that the goods sold are suitable for a special purpose of the buyer;
under the warranty of merchantability principle, the seller warrants only that the
goods are reasonably fit for general purposes for which they are sold. Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1961). Thus, in the
blood donation context, because suppliers distribute blood for the general purpose of maintaining health and life, an implied warranty claim should focus
upon the warranty of merchantability principle. Compare U.C.C. § 2-314 with
U.C.C. § 2-315.
As explained by one commentator, in a claim under breach of the warranty
of merchantability theory to recover damages for the transfusion of HIV-positive
blood, plaintiff blood recipients must show that:
The providing of blood and blood products is tantamount to a sale for
which the implied warrant[y] attach[es]. By providing the blood disseminated to the plaintiff, the supplier impliedly warrant[s] that the
blood was merchantable ... for the ordinary purposes for which it was
to be used. Additionally, plaintiffs argue that the supplier, at the time
of the sale, knew that the plaintiff was relying on its skill and judgment
to select and furnish suitable blood. Presumably, because the blood
provided to the plaintiff was contaminated with the AIDS virus and resulted in his or her death, it was not merchantable ... for its intended
use.
Woods & Thornton, supra note 1, at 691.
Under both implied warranty and strict liability theories, the seller is liable
for any injury resulting from the use of the defective product without regard to
the seller's fault or negligence. Lipton, supra note 2, at 132-33. The imposition
of strict liability in implied warranty theory reflects the social policy that the
costs of physical injuries resulting from defective goods should be borne by
those who placed the goods into the stream of commerce. See W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 692-93 (5th ed.
1984). For a discussion of the effect of blood shield legislation on implied warranty claims, see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Due to the enactment of blood shield statutes 17 in the majority

16. See, e.g., Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300, 301 (W.D. Ky.
1988) (HIV-contaminated blood recipient sued medical center in strict liability
for supplying unreasonably dangerous product); Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590, 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (decedent's heirs
brought wrongful death action against laboratory on strict product liability theory for providing decedent with HIV-contaminated blood products); Snyder, 582
A.2d at 309 (strict liability suit brought against hospital, physicians and blood
bank for infusing plaintiff with HIV-infected blood product); Stenger, 563 A.2d at
533 (family brought strict liability claim against hospital and blood center for
providing HIV-positive blood to family member).
Strict liability permits the imposition of liability for the non-negligent sale
of defective products. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Priorto Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 739 (1983). This form
of liability is based upon the assumption that imposing strict liability upon manufacturers will be a financial incentive to market safe products. Lynn Shodahl,
Note, Liability for Transfusion-TransmittedDisease, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 141,

163 (1988) (arguing that strict liability is inappropriate for determining liability
in cases involving transfusion-transmitted diseases). Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the cause of action for strict liability of a
seller of a product for physical harm to the user or consumer:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a blood supplier may be shielded from strict liability if it can be
established that (1) the product's utility outweighs its inherent risks; (2) the
risks are known; (3) the product's benefits are not achievable in any other manner; and (4) the risks are unavoidable pursuant to present knowledge. See id.
§ 402A cmt. k. It is likewise undetermined if New Jersey courts will recognize
implied warranty causes of action to compensate plaintiffs for the transfusion of
HIV-contaminated blood products.
17. Forty-eight states have enacted legislation that effectively precludes
blood recipients from asserting an implied warranty and/or strict liability cause
of action against blood suppliers. Janowitz, supra note 2, at 617. Such legislation is generally termed "blood shield" legislation; however, it can take one of
several forms. See id. The causes of action under the Uniform Commercial Code
are often eliminated by statutorily classifying the provision of blood or blood
products as a service rather than as a sale of goods, thereby removing them from
the application of the implied warranties. Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-102 (Article 2 "applies to transactions in goods"). Other statutes expressly limit recovery under
both strict liability and implied warranty theories. Janowitz, supra note 2, at 617.
For example, Delaware's blood shield statute provides:
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale of human blood, blood plasma or
other human tissue or organs from a blood bank or reservoir of such
other tissues or organs. Such blood, blood plasma or tissue or organs shall not
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of jurisdictions, the negligence theory has become the most viable
means by which a plaintiff can recover from blood suppliers responsible
8
for wrongfully releasing tainted blood products for transfusion.'
for the purposes of this Article be considered commodities or goods subject to sale or
barter, but shall be considered as medical services.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (1975) (emphasis added).
In contrast, Pennsylvania's blood shield statute does not delineate this
sale/service dichotomy to exempt blood centers from liability under implied
warranty and strict liability causes of action. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 8333(a) (1982). Rather, the statute explicitly disallows strict liability and implied warranty causes of action in the context of the provision of blood products.
Id. Pennsylvania's blood shield statute provides in relevant part:
No person shall be held liable for death, disease or injury resulting
from the lawful transfusion of blood, blood components or plasma derivatives, or from the lawful transplantation or insertion of tissue, bone
or organs, except upon a showing of negligence on the part of such
person. Specifically excluded hereunder is any liability by reason of any rule of
strict liability or implied warranty or any other warranty not expressly undertaken
by the party to be charged.
Id. (emphasis added).
New Jersey is one of two states that has not enacted a blood shield statute.
The NewJersey Superior Court has established, however, that under certain circumstances, blood products may constitute "unavoidably unsafe products," and
are thus excluded from the reach of strict liability. See Brody v. Overlook Hosp.,
317 A.2d 392, 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON TORTS, § 99, at 661-62 (4th ed. 1971)), aft'd, 332

A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975). In Brody, the court held that hepatitis-contaminated blood
was an unavoidably unsafe product because, at the time it was transfused to the
plaintiff, testing was not available to determine whether donor blood was tainted
by the hepatitis virus. Id.
This rationale was extended by the New Jersey Superior Court to apply to
litigation stemming from the transfusion of HIV-infected blood prior to the
availability of HIV antibody screening tests. Snyder, 582 A.2d at 312. In Snyder,
the court found that prior to the availability of AIDS testing in 1985, there existed at least a 12% and as much as a 33% chance that AIDS-infected blood
would not be recognized as such, and would be released for transfusion to patients. Id. at 312. The court determined that the blood supply was unavoidably
unsafe during this period of time and thus precluded the application of strict
liability principles to blood collectors and distributors. Id.
Without blood shield legislation, it remains undetermined whether the New
Jersey courts will find that blood, donated after the HIV antibody screening tests
became available, should be deemed an unavoidably unsafe product. Presently,
less than a one percent chance that donated blood will test falsely negative for
antibodies to HIV exists.
18. To successfully recover under a negligence theory, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant had a duty to conform to a standard of conduct in
order to protect others from unreasonable risk of harm; (2) the defendant
breached this duty by not conforming to this standard; (3) a causal link existed
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the plaintiff
incurred damages. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 30, at 164-65. This relatively simple negligence analysis becomes concertedly more complex when applied to transfusion-related AIDS litigation. This is due to the variation over
time of the medical community's knowledge of the disease. See Lipton, supra
note 2, at 140-41. As scientific knowledge became more advanced, the duty that
the blood center owed to a potential recipient of a transfusion likewise expanded. See id. Each individual factual scenario must be subjected to the negli-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3

346

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 337

Because a known potentiality for false negative AIDS testing results
exists, 1 9 non-negligent donor screening pursuant to industry standards
requires that blood suppliers obtain a complete medical history from
potential donors. 20 Therefore, plaintiffs often desire direct access to the
gence analysis with particular attention given to the duty which existed at the
time of the donation. See id. For an overview of the progressive knowledge of
the scientific community, see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. For example, prior to 1983, no evidence existed that AIDS could be transmitted through
blood transfusions. Lipton, supra note 2, at 140. Consequently, recipients of
blood transfusions prior to 1983 appeared to be at no unreasonable risk of contracting AIDS and therefore a negligence cause of action would likely fail.
The negligence analysis that must be applied post-1983, but prior to the
availability of a screening test in 1985, becomes significantly more difficult. To
establish a prima facie case of negligence during this time frame, a plaintiff must
focus on a blood bank's implementation of (1) donor health history screening
procedures; (2) tests which, despite not being able to specifically test for the
AIDS antibody, illuminate donors as being at a high risk of contracting AIDS;
and (3) implementation of policies and procedures that may allow individuals to
avoid contracting AIDS, such as encouraging blood recipients to solicit their
own blood donors. See id.
The negligence analysis further changes when applied to transfusions that
occurred after mid-1985, when AIDS testing had become readily available. In
proving a cause of action of negligence in this context, a plaintiff blood recipient
should focus upon the speed with which a blood donor service implemented
testing and possibly upon the particular selection of one testing methodology
over another. Id. at 151; see also Turkington, supra note 2, at 898 (negligence
focus in post-testing era is upon improper administration of test or upon negligence in handling result); Shodahl, Note, supra note 16, at 148-51 (blood bank
may be found liable in negligence for failing to choose appropriate AIDS testing
device, incomplete performance of test and inaccurate documentation of result).
19. For a discussion of the inherent problems in AIDS testing due to false
negative test results, see supra note 2.
20. Federal regulations require that all donors must be screened for
"[f]reedom from any disease transmissible by blood transfusion, insofar as can
be determined by history and examinations." 21 C.F.R. § 640.3(b)(6) (1991).
The suitability of the donor is to be determined in part by means of obtaining a
medical history from the donor, as well as by "such physical examination as appears necessary to a physician." Id. § 640.3(a).
Screening of donors to obtain relevant medical histories is accomplished by
asking blood donors questions designed to elicit information concerning potential exposure to, or history of, diseases transmissible by blood. See Lipton, supra
note 2, at 161 n.123.
Questions asked of donors in order to determine potential exposure to or
history of AIDS include:
1. Have you ever had night sweats?
2. Have you ever had unexplained fevers?
3. Have you ever had unexpected weight loss?
4. Have you ever had persistent diarrhea?
5. Have you ever had generalized lymph node enlargement or unusual skin lesions, especially purple bumps under the skin that seem
to spread locally or to be present in widely separated areas?
6. Have you ever had intimate or sexual contact with an individual at
increased risk for AIDS? Responses to this question are clarified by
asking the following questions as well:
a. Have you had sex with a prostitute in the past six months?
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necessary information from the blood donors themselves in order to
prove whether the defendant blood suppliers exercised due care in care21
fully questioning the donors about their medical histories.
NewJersey plaintiffs may utilize the NewJersey AIDS Assistance Act
(the Act) to glean this vital information from blood donors. Pursuant to
the Act, "[t]he record of a person who has or is suspected of having
AIDS or HIV infection may be disclosed by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction which is granted pursuant to an application showing
b. Have you had sexual contact with homosexual or bisexual men
since 1977?
c. Have you lived in a country such as Haiti or Africa since 1977
where heterosexual activity is thought to play a major role in transmission of HIV?
7. Are you a past or present abuser of intravenous drugs?
8. Are you a hemophiliac?
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, TECHNICAL MANUAL 6-7 (10th ed.
1990).
21. Woods & Thornton, supra note 1, at 713 (arguing that blood donor's
testimony is important because "blood donors may be witnesses to some of the
most important events surrounding the donation process"). The donor could
likely relate to the plaintiff whether the blood supplier informed the donor that
members of high-risk groups should not donate blood, and whether the blood
supplier carefully explained these high-risk groups so that the donor could ascertain whether he or she fit within any such group. Id. at 713-14. The donor
could also disclose his or her true physical condition on the date of the donation, whether he or she answered all of the screening questions that the blood
bank asserts were answered, and whether these questions were answered in the
manner indicated in the blood bank's records. Id.
As a result of the donor's knowledge as to the circumstances surrounding
his or her donation, plaintiffs frequently seek to question donors about the donation process in order to establish liability of blood suppliers. See, e.g., Bradway
v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (blood recipient
argued for need to question donor about accuracy and negligence of Red Cross'
blood screening and testing procedures in order to be able to bring cause of
action); Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 361 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
(plaintiff requested donor be identified so that he might be questioned concerning Red Cross' donor screening procedures and whether donor should have
been deferred); Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. La. 1989)
(recipient of blood transfusion sought discovery of donor information concerning medical examination and questions asked of donor prior to donation); Doe
v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 649 (D. S.C. 1989) (blood
recipient requested right to question donor about acts or omissions of Red
Cross in donor screening process); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District
Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Colo. 1988) (plaintiff sought to question donor to
ascertain if blood center followed its own blood donor screening procedures);
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 534 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(plaintiff requested right to question blood donor as to what screening procedures donor was subjected to prior to donating blood), aft'd, 609 A.2d 796 (Pa.
1992); Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 180 (Allegheny County
1987) (plaintiff likely to learn from donor if he or she was within high-risk group
at time of donation, and if so, if he or she was informed by blood bank not to
donate blood, as well as if blood bank took a personal history). But see Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987) (blood recipient sought only to discover list of names of blood donors in order to compare
such listing with list of known AIDS victims and illegal drug users).
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The Act further states that a showing of "good

cause" is established by balancing the public interest and need for disclosure against the injury to the person who is the subject of the record,
to the physician-patient relationship and to the services offered by the
program. 23 Although no New Jersey court prior to Snyder had interpreted the Act, many courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the
various issues inherently implicated by its statutory provisions; namely,
the blood donor's right to confidentiality and privacy, 24 the physicianpatient privilege, 25 society's interest in an adequate and safe blood supply,2 6 and the plaintiff's interest in discovery of information relevant to
27
his or her case.
A.

The Blood Donor's Right to Confidentiality and Privacy

In transfusion-related AIDS litigation, the constitutionally-based
privacy right of an individual to be free from involuntary public disclosure of private matters is implicated. 2 8 This privacy interest has been
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1991).
23. Id. § 26:5C-2 to 5C-12. This Act provides in relevant part:
The record of a person who has or is suspected of having AIDS or
HIV infection may be disclosed by an order of a court of competent
jurisdiction which is granted pursuant to an application showing good
cause therefor. At a good cause hearing the court shall weigh the public interest and need for disclosure against the injury to the person who
is the subject of the record, to the physician-patient relationship, and to
the services offered by the program. Upon the granting of the order,
the court, in determining the extent to which a disclosure of all or any
part of a record is necessary, shall impose appropriate safeguards to
prevent an unauthorized disclosure.
Id. § 26:5C-9(a).
This Act also states that "[e]xcept as provided in subsections a. and b. of
this section, a record shall not be used to initiate or substantiate any criminal or
civil charges against the person who is the subject of the record or to conduct
any investigation of that person." Id. § 26:5C-9(c).
Under subsection b., a court may authorize disclosure of a patient's medical
record for investigating or prosecuting a crime that the patient is suspected of
committing if (1) the crime is a.first degree crime; and (2) "there is a reasonable
likelihood that the record in question will disclose material information or evidence of substantial value in connection with the investigation or prosecution."
Id. § 26:5C-9(b).
24. For a discussion of the blood donor's right to confidentiality and privacy, see infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the physician-patient privilege, see infra notes 40-49
and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of society's interest in an adequate and safe blood supply, see infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the plaintiff's interest in discovery of information
relevant to his or her case, see infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
28. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (asserting that one kind
of interest protected by zone of privacy "is the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483
(1965) ("[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected
from governmental intrusion.").
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defined as "essentially an interest in confidentiality."'2 9 Assurances of
confidentiality upon blood donation encourage donors to feel free to
honestly and accurately convey information concerning their health histories without fear of disclosure to persons outside of the donation process. 30 This confidentiality is especially meaningful with the advent of
AIDS, because disclosure of a donor's HIV-positive status could potentially impact his employment, insurability, reputation in the community
and personal relationships. 3 ' One commentator has opined that publiIn Whalen, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of a practice of the State of New York whereby the names and addresses of all
persons who were prescribed drugs, for which there existed both a lawful and
unlawful market, were recorded in a centralized computer file. Whalen, 429 U.S.
at 591. This information was to be used solely by the New York Department of
Health to assist in preventing the unlawful prescription and use of dangerous
drugs. Id. at 592. Plaintiffs, who were lawfully prescribed drugs by physicians,
feared that disclosure of this information would cause them to be labeled as
drug addicts. Id. at 595. The Whalen Court recognized that a right to privacy
exists in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters. Id. at 599-600. The Court
also recognized that a person's reputation may be harmed if the person's identity and prescription data are made publicly known. Id. at 600. Nevertheless,
the Court found that no constitutional invasion of privacy existed in this instance
because the statute contained provisions that made the risk of public disclosure
of this information remote. Id. at 603-04.
29. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that privacy interest of blood donors in not disclosing certain personal matters plus public interest in free flow of donated
blood outweighs blood recipient's interest in discovering names and addresses
of donors), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
30. Lipton, supra note 2, at 161. The medical history is utilized to determine if the prospective donor has potentially been exposed to diseases transmissible by blood, such as hepatitis B and AIDS. Id. at 161 n.123. Because both
hepatitis and AIDS are transmitted primarily by sexual contact, admitting exposure to either of these diseases could be embarrassing and detrimental to a prospective donor. Id. at 161 & n.124.
31. Id. at 161; see, e.g., Edward E. Hollowell & James E. Eldridge, Constitutional Law: Subsistence, Equal Opportunity, and the Individual Diagnosed with HIV, 9 J.
LEGAL MED. 561, 561-62 (1988) (employment, housing, medical care and education rights may be affected by one's HIV-positive status); Lipton, supra note 2, at
161 n. 124 (affirmative indication of exposure to, or history of, AIDS could have
potential impact on employment and insurance); Turkington, supra note 2, at
882 (persons infected with AIDS virus or who suffer from full-blown disease
have been subjected to "intolerance, ostracism, discrimination and violence");
Shodahl, Note, supra note 16, at 141 (public fear has resulted in ostracism of
those with AIDS).
Case law supports these commentators' opinions. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board
of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1378-79 (E.D. La. 1989) (nurse sued hospital
after being discharged for refusing to divulge information about HIV status),
aff'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV 87-2514,
1988 WL 81776, at * i (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988) (plaintiff discharged from residential alcohol and drug rehabilitation program after testing HIV-positive); Ray
v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1526 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (parents sought injunctive relief to prevent school district from excluding HIV-positive hemophiliac sons from classroom); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp.
376, 377 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (parents sued to require school district to allow child
infected with HIV to attend integrated kindergarten classes).
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cation of AIDS-related information constitutes the most serious invasion
of privacy, because one's infection with such a communicable, incurable
and fatal disease reflects upon the infected person's most basic sense of
32
identity and security.
Several courts have addressed the issue of a blood donor's right to
confidentiality within the context of determining whether a plaintiff
blood recipient may compel discovery from a blood donor.3 Thus far,
several courts have determined that the donor's privacy interest is constitutionally-based, but have ultimately relied on local discovery rules,

rather than constitutional principles, to resolve underlying discovery
issues.

34

32. Turkington, supra note 2, at 880-81. Because AIDS is known to be
transmissible through anal and vaginal sexual intercourse, intravenous drug use
with contaminated syringes, transfusions of contaminated blood products and
from mother to child during pregnancy, the fact that someone is infected with
HIV constitutes very intimate information. Id. at 881.
33. For a discussion of cases addressing the issue of a donor's right to confidentiality, see infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535
(Fla. 1987); Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 186 (Allegheny
County 1987).
In Rasmussen, the Florida Supreme Court sought to determine the privacy
rights of 51 unidentified blood donors from whom plaintiff blood recipient
sought information in order to determine whether he contracted the AIDS virus
from any of them when transfused with their donated blood. Rasmussen, 500 So.
2d at 534. The Rasmussen court agreed with the lower court's finding that the
donors' rights of privacy were protected by the Constitution. Id. at 534-35. The
court, however, based its decision to reject plaintiff's discovery request on the
grounds of the state's discovery rules, thus avoiding a traditional constitutional
analysis of the issues presented in the case. Id. at 535.
In Taylor, the court was again confronted with a plaintiff blood recipient who
sought to discover the identity of a blood donor. Taylor, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at
178-79. The Taylor court found that "the [defendant] blood bank's claim that
the identity of its blood donors is constitutionally protected carried substantial
weight." Id. at 185. But, as in Rasmussen, instead of undertaking a constitutional
analysis, the Taylor court premised its decision to deny disclosure of this information upon the Pennsylvania discovery rules. Id. at 186. The Taylor court concluded that disclosure of the identity of blood donors would have a "chilling"
effect on the blood bank's ability to maintain a sufficient supply of blood from
voluntary donors. Id.
Therefore, although courts have found constitutional implications inherent
in the disclosure issue, no court has ventured to base its decisions solely upon
this ground. Moreover, courts have disagreed with the Taylor and Rasmussen
courts' inclination that constitutional rights may be implicated by the discovery
of blood donor information. See, e.g., Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121
F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (claim of constitutionally protected blood donor privacy is beyond boundaries of right of privacy as established by United
States Supreme Court); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675,
679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (order compelling identification of blood donors not
impermissible violation of their rights to privacy).
If a blood donor's constitutional rights are to be contemplated in this context, an issue arises as to whether the defendant blood suppliers have standing
to assert the constitutional rights of the blood donor. As stated by one commentator, "the blood donors' constitutional rights are being asserted, without their
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In considering the issue of blood donor discovery, most courts have
35
relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and similar local rules.
Rule 26(c) provides that when discovery is sought, a court may make any
order "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense."'3 6 In order to determine the
appropriate level of protection to be afforded blood donors, courts must
consent or knowledge, by an institution which may have an ulterior motive for
opposing discovery." Denise C. Andreson, Note, AIDS-Related Litigation: The
Competing Interests Surrounding Discovery of Blood Donors' Identities, 19

IND.

L. REV.

561, 584-85 (1986) (demonstrating that case law does not support Rasmussen's
extension of disclosural right to privacy and arguing that societal interest in
maintaining adequate blood supply would not be compromised by allowing
discovery).
In order for a litigant to properly assert a constitutional right of a third

party, the litigant must show that (1) the litigant and third party are inextricably
bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, and (2) some obstacle
exists to the third party asserting his or her own rights. Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 114-16 (1975). The Taylor court specifically addressed the issue of
standing, concluding that the defendant blood bank had standing to raise its
donors' privacy claims because these rights would not otherwise be protected.
Taylor, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 181. The Rasmussen court, however, failed to discuss

the blood center's standing to assert the donors' constitutional rights. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
35. See, e.g., Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. La. 1989)
(in applying Rule 26(c), privacy interest of donor must be weighed against plaintiff's right to obtain relevant information); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood
Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 649 (D.S.C. 1989) ("In deciding whether to issue a Protective Order under Rule 26(c), the court must balance the competing interests."); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1010
(Colo. 1988) (Colorado discovery rule similar to Rule 26(c) mandates balancing

of competing interests served by granting or denying discovery of blood donors'
identities); Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535 (court must balance competing interests
that would be served by granting or denying discovery when deciding whether
protective order under Florida discovery rule similar to Rule 26(c) is appropriate); Taylor, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 187 (decision whether or not to compel discovery pursuant to Pennsylvania rule similar to Rule 26(c) depends upon balancing

competing interests).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) provides:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in

which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a
deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken
may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-

pense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery
not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms
and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that
the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain

matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except

persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the
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37
balance the inherently competing interests of privacy and discovery.

parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed
in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part,
the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any
party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.
Id.
37. See, e.g., Boulte, 127 F.R.D. at 125 (in applying Rule 26(c), privacy interest of donor must be weighed against plaintiffs' right to obtain relevant information); American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. at 649 ("In deciding whether to
issue a Protective Order under Rule 26(c), the court must balance the competing
interests."); Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1010 (when applying Colorado discovery
rule similar to Rule 26(c) to determine extent information sought to be discovered may be protected, "the trial court must balance the competing interests
that would be served by granting or denying discovery" of blood donors' identities); Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535 (court must balance competing interests that
would be served by granting or denying discovery when deciding whether protective order under Florida discovery rule similar to Rule 26(c) is appropriate);
Taylor, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 187 (decision whether or not to compel discovery
pursuant to Pennsylvania rule similar to Rule 26(c) is dependent upon balancing
competing interests).
In Belle Bonfils, for example, the Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed a trial
court's grant of a discovery order which allowed a plaintiff, who had contracted
AIDS from a blood transfusion, to contact the blood donor and attempt to determine his or her medical history. Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1005. The court
noted that the donor had a strong privacy interest in remaining anonymous and
avoiding the embarrassment of being identified as an AIDS carrier. Id. at 1012.
The court further recognized as important the interest of the blood center and
society in maintaining an adequate blood supply, society's interest in maintaining a safe blood supply, and the plaintiffs' right to discovery of all information
needed to pursue the case. Id.
The Belle Bonfils court specified that society's interest in a safe blood supply
favored discovery because the blood center should not be immune when it is in
the business of providing a product capable of transmitting disease. Id. at 101213. The court favored discovery because, without the identity of the HIV-infected donor, the plaintiffs would not be able to discover whether the defendant
blood center followed the screening procedures as to this donor and would have
insufficient information to prosecute their claim. Id. at 1013. Thus, the court
found that the plaintiffs' interest in discovery outweighed the privacy interests of
the blood donor. Id. The Belle Bonfils court, however, tailored discovery so as to
protect the donor as much as possible. Id. at 1013-14. The court determined
that the donor could be deposed by written questions submitted to the court by
plaintiffs and forwarded by the court to the donor. Id. Thus, the donor's identity could be protected while allowing the plaintiffs to obtain relevant information to proceed with their claim. Id.
Like other courts that have permitted discovery from blood donors who
have tested HIV-positive, the Belle Bonfils court has seemingly adhered to the
view that discovery should be more limited when directed at third persons who
are not parties to litigation. See Dart Indus. Co. v. Westwood Chem. Co., 649
F.2d 646, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that although discovery should not be
"unnecessarily" restricted, "the 'necessary' restriction may be broader when a
nonparty is the target of discovery"); Collins & Aikman Corp. v. J.P. Stevens &
Co., 51 F.R.D. 219, 221 (D.S.C. 1971) (finding that discovery should be more
limited to protect third parties from harassment, inconvenience or disclosure of
confidential documents).
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In addition to considering constitutional mandates and discovery
rules in addressing a plaintiff blood recipient's discovery request, some
courts have decided this issue on the basis of the donor's expectation of
privacy that arises when he or she is assured by the blood supplier that
his or her identity and medical history will remain confidential.3 8 Such
decisions comport with precedent establishing that one's expectation of
privacy should be considered when determining his or her privacy
39
rights.

B.

The Physician-PatientPrivilege

A physician-patient privilege has been statutorily adopted by almost
every state. 40 In general, such statutes provide legal protection against
the compelled disclosure of confidential medical records and other information arising out of a physician-patient relationship. 4 1 The in38. See, e.g., Laburre v. EastJefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1384-85
(La. 1990) (hepatitis case in which court found that justice required that discovery of names and addresses of donors not be permitted in order to protect confidentiality promised to blood donors); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538
N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that blood donor's expectation
of privacy arising from written assurances of confidentiality given during screening process outweighed blood recipient's discovery interests).
In Laburre, the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that the assurances of
confidentiality that blood centers give blood donors during the screening process concerning blood donors' medical histories, drug use and sexual activity
gave rise to an expectation of privacy for blood donors. Laburre, 555 So. 2d at
1384. The court further stated that a "strong possibility" existed that without
these assurances, blood donors would not honestly answer the questions posed
by screeners. Id.
39. See Humphrey v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 877, 879
(Ohio 1986) (per curiam) (finding that non-party patients had substantial right
not to disclose that they have Legionnaires' Disease); State v. Port Clinton Fisheries, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 865, 865 (Ohio 1984) (concluding that "the government
may assert the right to withhold the identities of informants in civil actions
brought by the state pursuant to its police powers to protect a public trust").
The Humphrey court, in holding that patients who were not parties to the
litigation had a substantial right to confidentiality, emphasized that "a substantial right is affected where a request for disclosure of sensitive information is
involved, when that information was initially given upon a promise of anonymity." Humphrey, 488 N.E.2d at 879.
40. Laburre, 555 So. 2d at 1383 (citing Sco-r N. STONE & RONALD S. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 7.02 (1983)).
41. Lipton, supra note 2, at 164, 166. Some statutes are very broad and
apply to any confidential information obtained by a physician from a patient. Id.
(citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307(a) (1981)). Other statutes are less broad and
apply to information that "would tend to 'blacken the character' of the patient."
Id. (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (1982)). A third category of statutes requires that the information be "communicated" from physician to patient. Id.
In addition to protecting medical information of the patient, most physician-patient privilege statutes also protect against disclosure of patient names
and identifiers if such disclosure would "inevitably link" the patient to the confidential information. Id. at 165. The privilege can be asserted by the physician
on behalf of the patient. Id.
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tended effect of the physician-patient privilege is to encourage a patient
to fully disclose his or her symptoms to a physician in order for the physician to properly diagnose and treat the patient, without the patient
fearing that the information disclosed may later be used to his or her
embarrassment and/or legal detriment. 42 For example, in New Jersey
the relevant statute limits the application of the physician-patient privilege to situations in which "the patient or the physician reasonably believed the communication to be necessary or helpful to enable the
physician to make a diagnosis of the condition of the patient or to pre' '43
scribe or render treatment therefor.
Application of this privilege to blood donation situations has been
largely unsuccessful. 44 A blood donor is not usually seen by a physician
42. See Laburre, 555 So. 2d at 1383-84. The Laburre court recognized that
the threat of disclosure of patient confidences may deter patients from revealing
humiliating or embarrassing information, or information which could be the basis for legal liability. Id. at 1383 (citing Scorr N. STONE & RONALD S. LIEBMAN,
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 7.02 (1983)). The court duly noted that it is not conducive to treatment or therapy for patients to withhold relevant information
from their physicians. Id. at 1384.
43. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2(b) (West 1976). The text of this section
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person, whether or not a
party, has a privilege in a civil action or in a prosecution for a crime or
violation of the disorderly persons law or for an act of juvenile delinquency to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing, a
communication, if he claims the privilege and the judge finds that
(a) the communication was a confidentialcommunication between patient and
physician, and (b) the patient or the physician reasonably believed the communication to be necessary or helpful to enable the physician to make a diagnosis of the
condition of the patient or to prescribe or render treatment therefor, and (c) the

witness (i) is the holder of the privilege or (ii) at the time of the communication was the physician or a person to whom disclosure was made
because reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication or for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was transmitted or (iii) is any other person who obtained knowledge or
possession of the communication as the result of an intentional breach
of the physician's duty of nondisclosure by the physician or his agent or
servant and (d) the claimant is the holder of the privilege or a person
authorized to claim the privilege for him.
Id. § 2A:84A-22.2 (emphasis added).

44. Lipton, supra note 2, at 169 (arguing that while cases do not extend

privilege to blood donors, "the reasons for so extending the privilege do exist
and should control"); see Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court,
763 P.2d 1003, 1009 (Colo. 1988) (concluding that physician-patient privilege is

inapplicable to blood donations because donor not seen by physician and did
not receive medical care as required by Colorado legislation establishing privilege); Laburre, 555 So. 2d at 1383-84 (concluding that Louisiana physician-patient privilege is not applicable because blood donor not patient within

contemplation of act); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding that Pennsylvania physician-patient privilege does
not extend to blood donation setting because donor is not patient and blood
center employee is not physician), aff'd, 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 422-23 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (finding that
Ohio's physician-patient privilege requiring elements of physician, patient and
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when donating blood. 4 5 Thus, it is difficult to -establish that a physicianpatient relationship was created. 4 6 In addition, a blood donor is not
often considered a patient in the blood donation setting because he or
47
she is not seeking diagnosis or treatment.
Thus far, only a New York trial court has denied discovery of blood
donors' identities on the basis of the physician-patient privilege. 48 Nocommunication for purpose of diagnosis or treatment are not fulfilled in course
of blood donations); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675,
677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Texas physician-patient privilege is not
applicable to blood donors because donors are not considered patients and are
not seen by physicians as defined by act). For a discussion of a case extending
the physician-patient privilege to the blood supplier-blood donor relationship,
see infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
Blood suppliers have difficulty invoking the physician-patient privilege in
the blood donation setting because suppliers may be found to lack standing to
assert this privilege on behalf of their donors. Unfortunately, the only court that
has thus far permitted a blood supplier to assert the physician-patient privilege
on behalf of its donor failed to discuss the blood supplier's standing to do so.
See Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). However,
authority does exist for the proposition that a hospital may assert the physicianpatient privilege on behalf of a patient. See Division of Medical Quality v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (hospital had standing to assert
physician-patient privilege on behalf of absent non-consenting patients). Even
under Gherardini,uncertainty exists as to whether blood suppliers could also assert an applicable physician-patient privilege on behalf of their donors. This
uncertainty exists because it is possible to distinguish the hospital in Gherardini
from blood suppliers on the factual basis that the hospital in Gherardiniwas not a
defendant facing potential liability for negligence surrounding the treatment of
these patients. See id. at 57.
45. See Lipton, supra note 2, at 166. Federal regulations do not expressly
indicate what type of professional must head blood banks and blood centers. See
21 C.F.R. § 600.10 (1991) (stating only that "[a] person shall be designated as
the responsible head ... of the establishment").
46. See Lipton, supra note 2, at 166. Even the most broadly-worded physician-patient privilege statutes require that a physician, not a nurse or technician,
attend the patient in order for the privilege to be invoked. Id. Several courts, by
focusing on the absence of a physician attending the patient during the blood
donation process, prevented defendant blood suppliers from invoking the privilege. See, e.g., Stenger, 563 A.2d at 537 (finding that there was no indication that
blood donation procedure was performed by physician as required by statute to
invoke physician-patient privilege); University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d at 422-23
(finding that one of elements of physician-patient privilege was absent because
donor's blood not drawn by physician); Tarrant County, 734 S.W.2d at 677 (Texas
privilege requires patient be seen by physician, and no evidence was brought
forth to show that donor consulted physician upon blood donation).
47. See, e.g., Laburre, 555 So. 2d at 1384 (stating that "blood donor is not a
patient who consults blood bank personnel for treatment or therapy" within
meaning of Louisiana physician-patient privilege statute); University of Cincinnati,
538 N.E.2d at 422-23 (concluding that blood donor not considered patient and
information provided by blood donor not communication as defined by Ohio
statute); TarrantCounty, 734 S.W.2d at 677 (because blood donor did not consult
physician for medical care upon donation, he could not qualify as patient pursuant to Texas statute).
48. Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)
(finding that physician-patient privilege can be invoked to prevent disclosure of
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tably, one of the reasons why this court relied on the physician-patient
privilege as a basis for its decisions was because the defendant blood
supplier had a physician present at all times for the final approval of all
49
of its donors.
C.

Society's Interest in an Adequate and Safe Blood Supply

AIDS-related litigation has spawned a tremendous amount of speculation regarding the potential effect that discovery of information from
blood donors might have on the nation's blood supply. One view in
favor of permitting discovery is that society's interest in a healthy blood
supply may be promoted by "proving sloppy or careless donor screening procedures and by allowing a court to award punitive damages." 50
A Louisiana district court relied on this proposition, finding that disclosure of information from an infected donor would promote a just outcome to the plaintiff infected with AIDS. 5 1 The court also opined that
discovery would ensure that blood suppliers would establish and impledonor's identity because physician, nurse or phlebotomist attends donor,
thereby complying with privilege statute). In Krygier, the plaintiff sought the
names and addresses of blood donors whose blood was transfused into her husband who died as a result of contracting the AIDS virus from a blood transfusion. Id. In denying disclosure, the Krygier court applied the New York
physician-patient privilege statute. Id. This statute states in part:
Confidential information privileged. Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine, registered professional
nursing, licensed practical nursing, dentistry, podiatry or chiropractic
shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in
attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary
to enable him to act in that capacity....
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 4504(a) (McKinney 1992).
49. Krygier, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 476. Moreover, the Krygier court found that the
person who attended the donor at this blood bank must have been either a physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse or phlebotomist. Id. The court,
however, did not specifically discuss how a phlebotomist could qualify as a protected health care professional under the statute. See id. In addition, when stating that a physician is present at the blood bank "for the final clearance of all
donors," the court did not specify if the blood bank's policies required a physician to clear all donors for donation, or if only suspect donors were referred to a
physician. See id.
Even if the Krygier decision can be taken at face value to mean that the presence of a physician to clear all donors for donation allows invocation of the physician-patient privilege, it must be noted that federal regulations do not require
that the medical director of a blood bank or center be a physician. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 600.10 (1991). Therefore, it is unlikely that many blood suppliers would presently meet the Krygier criterion.
50. Woods & Thornton, supra note 1, at 715 (setting forth possible arguments plaintiff in AIDS litigation case could make concerning disclosure of donor information, including assertion that society has interest in provision of
disease-free blood).
51. Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989) (holding that "[d]iscovery of relevant information from the subject donor is therefore
appropriate, although a protective order will be entered to preserve the confidentiality of the donor's identity").
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52
ment the highest standards in the collection and sale of blood.
Many courts, however, have deemed disclosure to be so detrimental
to the future of the nation's blood supply that any discovery from the
blood donor has been precluded. 53 This result is due in part to the perception that the promotion of an all-voluntary blood donation system is
necessary in order to ensure the safety and adequacy of the nation's
blood supply. 54 This perception is based on the presumption that the
blood of volunteer donors is less likely to be contaminated with infectious diseases than that of paid donors. 55 As enunciated by one district
court, "[t]he specter of becoming involved in litigation, whether as a
party or a witness, along with the potential for probing questions concerning a person's private life would certainly serve to dampen any charitable disposition toward donating blood."' 56 Moreover, as another
district court found, disclosure of blood donor information could affect

52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D.
Ga. 1990) (denying discovery of donors' identities out of concern for nation's
blood supply); Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 362 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (finding that potential danger to volunteer blood supply should donors' identities be disclosed outweighs plaintiff's discovery needs); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 653 (D.S.C. 1989) (concluding
that erosion of confidentiality of blood donor information may affect not only
quantity of blood supply, but also its safety); South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that need for
free flow of donated blood combined with interests of donors outweighs plaintiff's interests in discovering names and addresses of blood donors), aff'd, 500
So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381,
1384-85 (La. 1990) (finding that prospect of blood donors being questioned by
lawyers about drug use, sexual practices and lifestyle will present significant disincentive to donate blood); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 425
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that denial of discovery of donor's name and
address will further society's interest in encouraging future voluntary blood donors); Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D & C.3d 178, 186 (Allegheny County
1987) (concluding that plaintiff's discovery request must be denied because of
chilling effect disclosure of blood donor's identity would have on ability of blood
bank to obtain sufficient supply of blood from voluntary donors).
54. See Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d at 803-04 (federal and state governments encourage voluntary blood donations because it has been determined that volunteer donors' blood is less likely to contain infectious agents than that of paid
donors).
55. Id.
56. Coleman, 130 F.R.D. at 362. At least one other court has agreed with
this proposition. See American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. at 653. The District Court of South Carolina found that the practice of permitting discovery of
donors would compel blood banks to warn donors of potential future discovery
should their blood contaminate the recipient in order to ensure that donors confer informed consent before donating their blood. Id.
Considering the personal and intimate questions donors must now answer
in order to donate blood, it must be noted that the questions asked of blood
donors in the course of permitted discovery would be likewise personal and intimate. For an example of screening questions that individuals may be asked
prior to being accepted as blood donors, see supra note 20.
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not only the quantity of available blood, but also its safety, because some
donors might be reluctant to reveal accurate information to the blood
supplier due to fear that personal aspects of their lives might later be
57
divulged.
In judging the impact that disclosure of a donor's identity could
have upon the blood supply, one appellate judge wisely pointed out that
"a determination of injury to society's interest by ... limited discovery
...

is no less speculative than a determination that ...

[limited discov-

ery] would benefit society by discouraging blood donations by those in' 58
fected with AIDS.
D.

The Plaintiff's Interest in Discovery of Relevant Information

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that "[p]arties
may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ...

[including]

the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter."' 59 The United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated
57. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. at 653 (quoting Taylor v.
West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 189-90 (Allegheny County 1987)). The
district court noted that the laws of its state do not permit the identity of the
donor of HIV-infected blood to be disclosed. Id. at 651 (quoting S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-29-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988)). The court further stated that such
laws "reflect the belief that the best strategy for limiting the spread of infectious
diseases is to encourage the segments of the population most likely to be infected to come forward voluntarily for testing." Id. at 653.
As amended in 1988, one of the South Carolina statutes construed by the
court in American Red Cross Blood Services states in part:
To the extent resources are available to the Department of Health
and Environmental Control for [the] purpose [of isolating persons infected or suspected of being infected with a sexually transmitted disease], when a person is identified as being infected with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus which causes Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), his known sexual contacts or intravenous drug contacts, or both, must be notified but the identity of the person
infected must not be revealed. Efforts to notify these contacts may be limited to the extent of information provided by the person infected with
HIV.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). The
court recognized that this, and similar statutes, are directed at the Department
of Health and Environmental Control and not at the courts, so that under these
statutes, the identities of donors are not absolutely privileged against discovery in
the context of negligence actions against blood banks. American Red Cross Blood
Servs., 125 F.R.D. at 651. The effect of the court's decision, however, was to
extend the privilege against disclosure to reach these actions because it found
that "[c]ourt decisions that permit discovery of donors infected with the AIDS
virus, even if they are narrowly drafted, will undermine [the] strategy [of limiting
the spread of infectious diseases] to some degree." See id. at 653.
58. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (citing South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798,
806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Schwartz, J., dissenting), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 533
(Fla. 1987)).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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60
that discovery rules are to be given broad and liberal construction.
Moreover, as stated by one district court, "[t]he private litigant and the
public have a strong interest in the fair and efficient resolution of civil
61
disputes in courts of law."

Within the context of transfusion-related AIDS litigation, the actual
blood donors are very likely the sole unbiased source of information as
to the blood suppliers' potential liability. 6 2 A plaintiff in such an action
typically sues in negligence, alleging that the blood supplier responsible
for releasing tainted donated blood for medical use was negligent in failing to adequately screen and test the donor for HIV. 6 3 Thus, plaintiffs
involved in these cases have a strong need to access information from
the donor himself.64

III.

ANALYSIS OF SNYDER V. MEKHJIAN

A.

Facts

Snyder v. Mekhjian 6 5 presents the first situation in which plaintiffs
utilized the New Jersey AIDS Assistance Act 66 as a means of discovering
60. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (defamation action). See
generally, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505-08 (1947) (discovery provisions
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed liberally).
61. Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388,
389-90 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (diversity breach of contract and defamation action).
62. For a discussion of the assertion that blood donors are often the sole
unbiased source of information concerning blood supplier liability, see supra
note 8.
63. For a discussion concerning the rationale for relying upon a negligence
cause of action in transfusion-related AIDS litigation, see supra notes 17-18 and
accompanying text.
64. For example, in Belle Bonfils, the Supreme Court of Colorado set forth
the following examples of questions that the plaintiffs might be able to ask the
blood donor:
1. Was a sufficient medical history taken?
2. Is the medical history taken accurately recorded in the blood
center's records?
3. Were answers in response to the blood center's questionnaire the
subject of discussion at the time of donation, and if so, to what
extent?
4. Did the donor give the same or different medical history before
donating blood in the past?
5. Were the questions asked of the donor upon this donation the
same as those asked for past donations?
6. Were the dangers involved in donating HIV-positive blood
discussed?
7. At any point during the interview did the interviewer recommend
the donor not give blood?
Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1013 n.13
(Colo. 1988).
65. 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991).
66. For a discussion of New Jersey's AIDS Assistance Act, see supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text.
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information from a blood donor with AIDS. During pre-trial discovery,
an interlocutory order by the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to discover information from a blood donor whose blood likely resulted in the
plaintiff blood recipient's HIV-positive status. 67 On appeal, the New
Jersey Superior Court reversed the trial court's order with regard to the
discovery issue, granting the plaintiffs the right to limited discovery
from the blood donor. 6 8 The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed
the opinion of the superior court per curiam. 6 9 Justice Pollock, how70
ever, authored an informative concurring opinion.
In August, 1984, William Snyder was transfused with donated blood
products, including platelets, while undergoing open heart surgery at St.
Joseph's Hospital in Paterson, New Jersey. 7 1 These blood products had
been supplied to St. Joseph's by Bergen Community Blood Center
(BCBC). 7 2 Two years later, a blood donor, from whom Snyder received
platelets during this surgery, again donated blood at BCBC. 7 3 By this
time, AIDS screening tests had been implemented, and the donor tested
positive for HIV antibodies. 74 From its records, BCBC ascertained that
St. Joseph's Hospital had received previous blood products from this
donor. 75 BCBC contacted St. Joseph's, which in turn determined that
William Snyder had been one of the recipients of platelets from this donor. 76 St. Joseph's Hospital notified William Snyder's physician of this
was not otherwise at
development, and in 1987, William Snyder, who
77
risk for contracting AIDS, tested HIV positive.
67. Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 309 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990),
aff'd per curiam, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991).
68. Id. at 314-15.

69. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 307 (Pollock, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
lower court's opinion, see infra note 85.
70. See Snyder, 593 A.2d at 319-28 (Pollock, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring). This transfusion took place in 1984
when it was known that AIDS could be transmitted in blood products, but when
testing was not yet available to detect antibodies to the virus in blood. This is
important because a blood supplier's duty under a negligence cause of action
will vary depending upon the knowledge of AIDS and HIV testing capabilities at
the time of a particular transfusion. For a discussion of the changing duties
owed blood recipients by blood suppliers, see supra note 18.
72. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring). BCBC is a member of
the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB), which collects approximately
one-half of the nation's blood supply. Id.(Pollock, J., concurring). The remainder is collected by the American Red Cross. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). The
AABB was also joined as a defendant in this case. Id. at 318.
73. Id. at 320 (Pollock, J., concurring).

74. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
75. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). BCBC traced the donor's previous donations pursuant to a nationwide "look back" program. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). This program was implemented to assist in identifying blood recipients
who received blood from donors who later test positive for HIV antibodies. Id.
(Pollock, J., concurring).
76. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
77. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
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In 1989, William Snyder and his wife filed suit alleging, inter alia,
that BCBC had been negligent in screening its donors for HIV. 7 8 BCBC
denied that the donor's blood product received by William Snyder in
1984 contained the virus, even though BCBC acknowledged that this
donor tested positive for HIV in 1986. 79 Therefore, the plaintiffs
sought pre-trial discovery of the donor to determine whether the donor
had likely been infected with HIV at the time of his or her 1984
donation. 8 0
78. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). Plaintiffs brought suit against St. Joseph's
Hospital, the physicians involved in Mr. Snyder's diagnosis and treatment,

BCBC and AABB. Snyder, 582 A.2d at 309.
In addition to their negligence claim, plaintiffs asserted a strict liability
cause of action against all defendants, claiming that donor screening techniques
could have been undertaken at the time of William Snyder's transfusion to

render the donated blood supply safe from AIDS contamination. Id. Plaintiffs
further alleged that because the blood supply could have been made safe, all
entities and individuals participating in the chain of collection and distribution
of this infected blood product should be held strictly liable. Id. The court

granted summary judgment to all defendants on the strict liability claim. Id. at

310, 315. This dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 319.
In their negligence claim, plaintiffs alleged that William Snyder's physicians
were negligent for failing to advise him of the risks inherent in receiving contaminated blood and failing to allow him the option of arranging to have family
members donate blood for his use. Snyder, 582 A.2d at 310. Also, negligence
was asserted specifically against William Snyder's surgeon for failing to repair a
bleeding artery during his first surgery. Id. This negligence resulted in a subse-

quent operation during which the contaminated transfusion was given. Id.
Plaintiffs claimed BCBC and AABB were negligent for failing to implement
available risk-reducing procedures in the blood collection process, and that
BCBC was also negligent for failing to follow screening procedures it did have in
place. Id. The negligence claim against all defendants survived summary judgment. Id.
In addition, plaintiff asserted consumer fraud and punitive damages claims
against all defendants based on their knowing and irresponsible failure to protect the blood supply from AIDS contamination. Id. The punitive damages
claims against the physicians and hospital were dismissed, but those against
AABB and BCBC survived. Id. The consumer fraud claims were dismissed
against all defendants. Id.

Thus, at the time the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the superior

court's discovery decision, only the negligence claims against Snyder's physi-

cians, AABB and BCBC remained, as well as the punitive damages claims against
AABB and BCBC.
79. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 320 (Pollock, J., concurring). Apparently, BCBC

preferred to take the position that the donor contracted AIDS after he or she
donated the blood transfused to plaintiff, and that plaintiff was exposed to HIV
by another means.
80. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). The superior court's opinion in this matter
set forth a number of questions which plaintiff William Snyder would need to ask

the blood donor to formulate his case against BCBC:
1. Did the donor have symptoms of lymph-node swelling or skin dis2.
3.

orders, which are suggestive of early AIDS infection, at the time of
this donation? If so, was he asked about them?
Was the donor physically examined to determine if he had the
above symptoms?
Was the donor given the appropriate high-risk group self-screening
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BCBC also claimed that it had supplied an information sheet to all
donors in 1984, which delineated the high-risk groups for AIDS and requested that persons voluntarily refrain from donating blood if they fell
within any of these groups. 8 ' In addition, BCBC claimed that it obtained a medical history from every donor to discover whether he or she
was a member of any high-risk group. 82 Thus, plaintiffs also sought pretrial discovery of the blood donor to determine whether BCBC had followed these screening procedures in accepting this donor's blood in
1984.83 Plaintiffs specified that they neither sought the donor's identity,
84
nor did they intend to sue the donor.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, apparently persuaded by the plaininformation, which might have indicated that he or she should not
donate?
4. Was a reasonable effort made to determine if he or she was in a
high-risk category?
5. Were his or her responses to the medical history questions accurately recorded?
6. Were the questions adequately explained?
7. Would present screening requirements, notwithstanding laboratory testing for the AIDS antibody, have revealed his or her AIDS
infection?
Snyder, 582 A.2d at 314.
81. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 319-20 (Pollock, J., concurring). This list specified
that the following individuals were at risk of having AIDS: those with signs and
symptoms of AIDS; sexual partners of those with AIDS; sexually active homosexual and bisexual men with more than one partner; Haitian entrants to the
U.S.; present or past intravenous drug abusers; hemophiliacs; and sexual partners of those at increased risk of AIDS. Id. at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring). This
listing concluded with the following statement:
Your blood bank is asking that you voluntarily refrain from donating at
this time if you are in any of the currently identified high-risk groups.
Although the majority of members of these groups are not carriers,
there is presently no means of detection and thus no mechanism to
identify those few who may be at risk.
Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 319-20 (Pollock, J., concurring). BCBC asserted that it asked a
series of twenty-nine questions in the course of soliciting a donor's medical history. Id. at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring). These questions included: "Are you in
general good health? Ever injected yourself with any drugs? Signs of swollen
glands or Kaposi's sarcoma [an AIDS-related disease]?" Id. at 319-20 (Pollock,

J., concurring).
These specific questions were asked to discover if the donor was a member
of any identified high-risk groups for contracting AIDS. Id. at 320 (Pollock, J.,
concurring). BCBC contended that the donor gave negative responses to each
of these questions. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
83. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
84. Id. (PollockJ., concurring). The plaintiffs' claim that they did not seek
to sue the blood donor is important because New Jersey's AIDS Assistance Act
strictly prohibits disclosure "to initiate or substantiate any criminal or civil
charges against the person who is the subject of the record or to conduct any
investigation of that person," except in certain circumstances. NJ. STAT. ANN. §
26:5C-9(c) (West Supp. 1991). For the relevant text of the New Jersey AIDS
Assistance Act, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. As noted by Justice Pollock, absent a showing of specific need, discovery of the donor's identity
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tiffs' arguments, affirmed the superior court's decision granting the
plaintiffs limited discovery of information from the blood donor.8 5 Unfortunately, the court did not express its reasoning in its per curiam
opinion.8 6 An analysis ofJustice Pollock's concurring opinion, however,
while not binding on the court in future decisions, may be helpful in
hypothesizing the court's reasoning.
Justice Pollock was guided by the New Jersey AIDS Assistance Act
in reaching his decision regarding the propriety of the plaintiffs' discovery request.8 7 Justice Pollock noted that the court's role under the Act
was to determine whether "good cause" existed to disclose the donor's
record.88 To determine good cause, the court is required to: (1) evaluate the effect of disclosure on the physician-patient relationship, the donor's privacy interest and the nation's blood supply, and (2) weigh these
would contravene the New Jersey AIDS Assistance Act. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 325
(Pollock, J., concurring).
85. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 319. The NewJersey Superior Court began its analysis of the donor discovery issue by noting that BCBC had already supplied
plaintiffs with the donor's registration form, from which the donor's name and
identifying information had been deleted. Snyder, 582 A.2d at 313. The court,
however, found compelling the plaintiffs' claim that additional information
about the donor was needed to prove causation and negligence on the part of
BCBC. Id. at 314-15.
Because BCBC refused to admit that the donor was HIV-positive at the time
of the donation that was ultimately transfused into William Snyder, the court
determined that plaintiffs were entitled to seek direct proof that the donor's
blood caused William Snyder's HIV-positive status. Id. at 314. Moreover, the
court found persuasive the notion that plaintiffs required highly relevant and
pertinent information about the donor screening process in order to prove
BCBC negligent, and that this information was not available from any source
other than the donor himself. Id.
The court noted that the New Jersey AIDS Assistance Act requires that the
plaintiffs' need for disclosure and the public interest be balanced against potential injury to the donor, to the physician-patient relationship, and to the blood
donation process. Id. For a discussion of the New Jersey AIDS Assistance Act,
see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. Without considerable discussion
as to the procedure used in balancing these interests, the court found that

"where, as here, a litigant's discovery need cannot otherwise be met and it is
possible to accommodate that need with limited and controlled intrusion, some
access under careful court supervision is appropriate and justifiable." Snyder,
582 A.2d at 314-15. The court recommended limited discovery in the form of
"veiled" depositions or depositions on written questions wherein the interests
of the public and the donor's privacy rights would not be unduly prejudiced. Id.
at 315. The court rationalized its decisions by stating that:
The degree of plaintiff's injury, his right to redress from those who may
have negligently failed to protect him, and his need for information
which only the donor can provide if redress is to be obtained, all justify
the limited disclosure we here sanction without unduly prejudicing the
interest of the public and the donor's privacy rights.
Id.
86. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 319.

87. For the text of relevant sections of the NewJersey AIDS Assistance Act,
see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
88. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 322 (Pollock, J., concurring).
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concerns against the public interest and the plaintiff's need for limited
discovery from the blood donor.8 9
Justice Pollock first addressed the physician-patient privilege issue,
noting that "the purpose of the privilege is to permit patients to disclose
facts necessary for diagnosis and treatment." 90 Citing the precedent of
other jurisdictions, Justice Pollock asserted that a blood donation by a
person for the benefit of another does not involve diagnosis or treatment as contemplated by New Jersey's physician-patient privilege. 9 1
Thus, Justice Pollock found that the New Jersey physician-patient privi92
lege is inapplicable in the blood donation setting.
Turning to the issue of the donor's privacy interest, Justice Pollock
concluded that "various considerations qualify the donor's expectation
of privacy." ' 9 3 Among these considerations, Justice Pollock noted that
the record did not show that BCBC had assured the donor of confidentiality in his or her responses to questions that were asked in order to
elicit the donor's medical history and potential high-risk status. 94 Moreover, Justice Pollock considered the fact that limited discovery measures
were possible so as not to excessively impinge upon the donor's privacy
89. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
90. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Dyal, 478 A.2d 390, 394

(N.J. 1984)). For the text of the New Jersey physician-patient privilege statute,
see supra note 43. For a general discussion of the application of this privilege to
AIDS-related litigation, see supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
91. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring); accord Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1009 (Colo. 1988) (finding that physician-patient privilege is not applicable to blood donation setting
because donor was not seen by physician and did not receive medical care as
required by Colorado legislation establishing privilege); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1383-84 (La. 1990) (concluding that Louisiana physician-patient privilege is not applicable because blood donor is not
patient within contemplation of act); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d
419, 422-23 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (stating that Ohio physician-patient privilege
requires elements of physician, patient and communication for purpose of diagnosis or treatment, none of which are fulfilled in course of blood donations);
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(finding that Pennsylvania physician-patient privilege does not extend to blood
donation setting since donor is not patient and blood center employee is not
physician), aff'd, 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v.
Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that Texas physician-patient privilege inapplicable to blood donors because they are not patients
and are not seen by physicians as defined by act).
92. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock did point out, however, that
despite failing to give such assurances, the standard practice for blood collection
agencies is to maintain donor confidentiality. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). For a
discussion of the interpretation by some courts that plaintiffs may not discover
the identity of blood donors when the donors have been assured that all information disclosed will remain confidential, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of blood donors' privacy interests as
determined by other jurisdictions, see supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
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interests. 9 5 For example, the trial court could make use of "veiled" depositions wherein the donor's name would not be disclosed; the court
would then limit the areas of questioning and impose other conditions
to ensure the donor's anonymity. 9 6 In the alternative, the trial court
could permit a deposition on written questions where the court would
rule on the questions before submission to the donor, and permit an
97
alias identification and oath.
Justice Pollock then addressed the defendants' assertion that the
NewJersey AIDS Assistance Act violated the donor's constitutional right
to privacy. 98 Justice Pollock concluded that the statute afforded sufficient protection to the donor's privacy interests. 99 To support his conclusion, Justice Pollock noted that United States Supreme Court
precedent did not support the conclusion that HIV-infected blood donors possess a fundamental right of privacy so as to preclude them from
participating in discovery proceedings.10 0 Rather, Justice Pollock determined that such precedent supported the conclusion that the legislature
determines the protection of the privacy concerns of donors. 0 1 Therefore, if an enacted statute is reasonable, it should withstand a constitutional challenge.' 0 2 Justice Pollock then determined that the New Jersey
95. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring).

96. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder, 582 A.2d at 315).
97. Id. at 324 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Snyder, 582 A.2d at 315).
98. Id. at 325 (Pollock, J., concurring).
99. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). Although Justice Pollock recognized the
hysteria associated with AIDS in our society, he determined that utilization of
protective measures to shield the donor's identity would sufficiently protect the
donor's privacy interests. Id. at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring). For a discussion of
the impact that disclosure of one's AIDS status might have on the individual, see
supra note 31 and accompanying text.
100. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock,J., concurring). Justice Pollock noted
that, in the last 15 years, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the
individual's interest in confidentiality three times and as yet, the Court has never
found that a statute impermissibly infringed upon such interest. Id. at 325; see
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465, 484 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of statute that authorizes offices of Executive Branch to take
custody of presidential papers and tape recordings and promulgate regulations
that provide screening by archivists and determine conditions upon which public
may access papers and recordings); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977)
(upholding constitutionality of New York statute that required persons taking
drugs having both lawful and unlawful market to provide the state with copy of
prescription); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 694 (1976) (holding that plaintiff was
not deprived of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment when police
circulated flyer containing photograph of plaintiff to warn merchants of possible
shoplifters). Justice Pollock concluded his analysis of these cases by stating that
"[t]hese cases suggest that the Court considers a person's right of nondisclosure
of personal matters not to be a fundamental right that triggers strict scrutiny."
Snyder, 593 A.2d at 325 (Pollock, J., concurring). For a discussion of Whalen, see
supra note 28.

TISE

101. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 326 (Pollock, J., concurring).
102. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREAON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.30, at 605 (1986).
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AIDS Assistance Act on its face afforded sufficient protection to the do0 3
nor's privacy interests.'

In considering the potential effect of permitting discovery of blood
donors upon the blood supply, Justice Pollock concluded that no support existed for the defendants' claim that subjecting donors to discovery would significantly affect the safety or adequacy of the blood
supply. 10 4 Justice Pollock argued that the quality of the blood supply
could be elevated by donor discovery, because donors with AIDS or
those within high-risk groups might be discouraged from donating
05
blood. 1
Justice Pollock finally considered the public and plaintiffs' interest
and need for disclosure, as required by the New Jersey AIDS Assistance
Act. 0 6 He noted that society has a legitimate interest in compensating
victims injured by the negligence of others. 10 7 This interest is most effectively promoted by allowing full discovery within the course of litigation. 10 8 Justice Pollock recognized that if the plaintiffs in this case were
not permitted to question the donor, their prima facie case of negligence would be based merely on inferences of breach of duty and causation. 0 9 He found that the donor was likely to possess highly relevant
information that was not available from any other source: "A complete
103. Id. at 327 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock was influenced by
the section of the NewJersey AIDS Assistance Act that states, "[u]pon the granting of the order, the court, in determining the extent to which a disclosure of all
or any part of a record is necessary, shall impose appropriate safeguards to prevent an unauthorized disclosure." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9(a) (West Supp.
1991).
104. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 324 (Pollock, J., concurring). For a discussion of
how other jurisdictions have interpreted the effect that donor discovery may
have upon the adequacy and safety of the blood supply, see supra notes 50-58
and accompanying text.
105. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 324 (Pollock, J., concurring).
106. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). For a discussion of how other jurisdictions have evaluated a plaintiff's interest in blood donor discovery, see supra
notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
107. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 324 (Pollock, J., concurring). As Justice Pollock
recognized, this societal interest is implied by the New Jersey AIDS Assistance
Act. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
108. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock further stated that "the
Legislature mandates that a court should weigh 'the public interest and need for
disclosure.' " Id. (Pollock, J., concurring) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9(a)
(West Supp. 1991)).
Justice Pollock also noted that the plaintiff had a compelling need to question the donor in order to prove causation and negligence. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring). The blood donor may assist the plaintiff in this case to establish
causation since the defendant blood center denied that the unit of blood product transfused to the plaintiff was HIV-positive. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
Moreover, the blood donor may assist the plaintiff in proving negligence because only the donor can instruct the plaintiff whether the blood center negligently screened the donor prior to donation. Id. at 325 (Pollock, J., concurring)
(quoting Snyder, 582 A.2d at 315).
109. See id. at 325 (Pollock, J., concurring).
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denial of discovery of the donor could subvert both the search for truth
in civil litigation and the goals of tort law to deter negligence and to
compensate injured parties."' 10
Upon consideration of the above factors, Justice Pollock concluded
that the superior court's decision should be affirmed, thereby permitting
William Snyder to seek limited discovery from the donor. II Justice Pollock determined that this discovery should proceed upon implementation of whatever protective mechanisms the trial court deemed
appropriate to protect the donor's privacy and identity. 1 12 In summation, Justice Pollock stated: "William Snyder entered St. Joseph's for
heart surgery. He now tests HIV positive and is living a medical tragedy. The judicial system cannot restore his health, but it can provide
him with a reasonable opportunity to discover if defendants were
negligent."' 13
Justice Garibaldi filed a dissenting opinion in which she acknowledged that in some situations the blood donor is the only individual who
can provide information to prove the blood supplier's negligence for the
transfusion of HIV-infected blood.' 4 Justice Garibaldi, however, did
not find discovery to be warranted in this case.' 15 Justice Garibaldi determined that the court must balance the party's need for the particular
discovery against the intrusiveness of the process to the party subject to
the discovery. 116 Justice Garibaldi noted, however, the possible intrusive nature of such discovery to the blood donor, who may be so ill that
discovery may be unduly burdensome. 1 7 Justice Garibaldi also noted
that the donor may incur financial difficulty if he or she prefers legal
representation in responding to discovery, and that discovery may result
in the donor's loss of confidentiality if it is revealed to unaware family
18
and friends that the donor is HIV-positive. 1
Moreover, Justice Garibaldi specified that the section of the AIDS
Assistance Act relied upon by Justice Pollock was merely a narrow exception to the overall non-disclosural posture of the Act.' 19 Justice Gar110. Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock stated that "I concur with [the per curiam] opinion [affirming the lower court's decision] and write
separately to emphasize the Court's reliance on the statutory balance of the donor's privacy interest, the plaintiffs' interest in full discovery and compensation
for the injuries they [sic] have sustained, and society's interest in a safe and adequate blood supply." Id. (Pollock, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 323-24 (Pollock, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder, 582 A.2d at
315).
113. Id. at 328 (Pollock, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 329-30 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 330 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice Pollock's
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ibaldi asserted that the section of the Act permitting disclosure of
information of those who are HIV-positive must be read in conjunction
with those sections that explicitly acknowledge and protect the rights of
such persons. '

2 0

Justice Garibaldi stressed that those courts that have permitted
some level of disclosure of this type of information have first found
either that the donor information was critical to the plaintiff's cause of
action, or that evidence already existed demonstrating wrongdoing on
the part of the blood bank or blood donor, both of which are contrary to
the facts of this case. 12 1 In addition, Justice Garibaldi noted that courts
must consider the probative value of the information sought prior to
permitting disclosure. 12 2 She suggested that a trial court faced with
having to apply a balancing test "must remain sensitive to the possibility
that plaintiffs' discovery motion might actually be an effort to cast a
broad net to expose the liability of any party in the donation process and
to create the basis for an additional lawsuit against the donor."1 2 3
Justice Garibaldi concluded by noting that the decision of whether
to authorize disclosure of donor information is "best left to the trial
court," and that the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in
denying discovery of the blood donor. 124 Justice Garibaldi was not persuaded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a compelling need for the
25
donor information to justify its disclosure.1
analysis of the New Jersey AIDS Assistance Act, see supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
120. Snyder, 593 A.2d at 330 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
profiled various sections of the New Jersey AIDS Assistance Act in support of

her contention that the legislative history of the Act illustrates a compelling
need for non-disclosure of HIV-information. Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi first noted that the Act provides that "records maintained by a
blood bank that contain identifying information about a person who has or is
suspected of having AIDS or HIV infection are confidential." Id. (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-7 (West Supp. 1991)). Moreover,
"[w]ithout prior written consent of the donor, the Act permits disclosure under

extremely limited conditions." Id.(Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:5C-8 (West Supp. 1991)). Justice Garibaldi also noted a statutory
provision requiring that an HIV-positive donor's name only be placed on a
deferral list maintained by a particular blood bank in order to ensure confidentiality, rather than be automatically transferred to a statewide deferral list without
the Department of Health deeming such transfer appropriate. Id. (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting) (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 8-6.5(0(2) (1991)).
121. Id.at 331 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 332 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 334 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
125. Id.(GaribaldiJ, dissenting). Justice Garibaldi noted that rarely will a
plaintiff be able to establish a compelling need for donor information, and even
when this burden is met, the court must ensure maximum protection of the
donor's confidentiality by narrowly limiting discovery. Id. (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
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B.

369

Impact

The Snyder opinion is an important development for New Jersey
plaintiffs and their attorneys who require discovery from blood donors
in order to proceed against blood suppliers in transfusion-related AIDS
litigation. No longer will defendant blood suppliers in situations factually similar to Snyder be permitted to completely shield blood donors
from plaintiffs under the guise of promoting donor confidentiality,
preventing harm to the physician-patient relationship, or maintaining
the future adequacy and safety of the nation's blood supply. Such a decision is of special significance to New Jersey plaintiffs because New
Jersey ranked fourth in the nation in the number of reported cases of
26
AIDS when the New Jersey AIDS Assistance Act was enacted.'
The Snyder opinion provides important precedent concerning donor
discovery in situations in which a plaintiff has alleged negligence following contraction of AIDS from a blood transfusion prior to the availability
of AIDS testing. Considering that a person may be infected with HIV
for up to ten years before he or she is diagnosed with AIDS,' 2 7 many of
these transfusion-related AIDS suits probably have yet to be instituted.
While Justice Pollock addressed many of the issues the Snyder case
raised, many questions still remain unanswered. Because Snyder dealt
with a person who contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion performed
before methods of testing donated blood were available, it is uncertain
how the NewJersey courts will decide the blood donor discovery issue in
cases involving persons who contracted AIDS from blood transfusions
performed after testing became available in 1985. The Snyder rationale,
however, should also be applicable to situations after 1985, in which donor blood has been tested for HIV antibodies, but the resulting negative
test results were inaccurate.' 28 Due to the inherent problems in the
AIDS testing process, blood donation centers are still required to carefully screen blood donors based upon their medical histories. Therefore, blood centers should still be subject to negligence suits based upon
their failure to exercise due care in screening out those donors at high
129
risk for AIDS.
It is also unclear whether New Jersey plaintiff-blood recipients will
be restricted to negligence causes of action for contraction of AIDS in
126. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-2(g) (West 1987). This provision states that
"the outbreak of AIDS has reached alarming proportions because of its highly
contagious nature with NewJersey ranking fourth in the nation of the number of
reported cases." Id.
127. See Baker, Comment, supra note 2, at 83 (citing Study Predicts 99 Percent
of Infected Men to Get AIDS, 3 AIDS POL'Y & L. (BNA) No. 11, at 2 (June 15,
1988)). The average incubation period of AIDS is 7.8 years. Id.
128. For a discussion of instances in which donor blood may test falsely
negative for the antibody to HIV, see supra note 2.
129. For a discussion of the importance of donor medical history screening
even after the implementation of AIDS testing, see supra note 2.
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the post-testing era. New Jersey has not enacted blood shield legislation
which would bar strict liability and implied warranty causes of action for
the provision of all blood products. 130 New Jersey precedent involving
strict liability causes of action has termed blood an unavoidably unsafe
product only with regard to transfusions during the pre-testing era when
there existed up to a one in 550 chance that HIV-positive blood would
be released for transfusion.' 3 1 Under AIDS testing methodologies, it is
yet to be determined if the current less than one in 40,000 chance that
HIV-positive blood may be released for transfusion will also result in
blood being labelled an unavoidably unsafe product, thus barring strict
liability causes of action for the transfusion of HIV-contaminated blood
that tested falsely negative.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Centers for Disease Control have estimated that up to one and
one half million Americans are infected with HIV, many of whom are
unaware of their condition.' 3 2 AIDS will continue to infiltrate our society and, as a result, the New Jersey courts can expect to receive requests
from many other plaintiffs like William Snyder who wish to question the
donors of transfused blood. Many blood recipients exposed to HIV by
blood transfusions during the pre-testing era may still not know of their
HIV-positive status. Furthermore, due to the fallibility of current testing procedures, donors will continue to test falsely negative, and their
blood will inadvertently be released by blood suppliers to infect others.
Moreover, this problem is not limited to the blood donation setting.
HIV may also be transmitted by way of organ donations, skin grafts and
artificial insemination, when the donors for these procedures either are
not tested or test falsely negative for antibodies to the virus. 13 3 Thus,
130. For a discussion of blood shield legislation, see supra note 17.
131. For a discussion of New Jersey law which classifies blood as an unavoidably unsafe product during the pre-testing era of AIDS, see supra note 17.
132. Baker, Comment, supra note 2, at 99.
133. See Centers for Disease Control, Semen Banking, Organ and Tissue Transplantation, and HIVAntibody Testing, 259JAMA 1301, 1301 (1988) (making recommendations regarding need to test prospective donors of organs, tissues and
semen pursuant to reports by Public Health Service that HIV has been transmitted through donations of organs, tissues and semen); Prem Kuman, M.D. et al.,
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus by Transplantation of a Renal Alograft,
with Development of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 106 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MED.

244, 244 (Feb. 1987) (report of kidney transplant recipient who contracted

AIDS from donated organ); G.J. Stewart et al., Transmission of Human T-Cell
Lymphotropic Virus Type III (HTLV-III) by Artificial Insemination by Donor, THE LANCET, Sept. 14, 1985, at 581 (finding that four out of eight recipients of artificial
insemination with semen from symptomless carrier of HIV had antibody to
virus).
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the breadth of potential plaintiffs who will seek donor discovery pursuant to New Jersey's AIDS Assistance Act has yet to be realized.
Kathryn Kruse
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